1. While not akin to actual Congressional proceedings, William C. Davis, "A Government of Our Own": The Making of the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994) presents an exhaustive analysis of the politicking in the "unremembered" Provisional Confederate Congress.
2. The rational choice paradigm, as it relates to legislative politics, is well known, so I will not elaborate further. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) and Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958) are seminal works, while John H. Aldrich, "Rational Choice Theory and the Study of American Politics," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder: Westview, 1994 ) provides a more recent overview.
3. See David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) . For an example of how reliance on political rhetoric can skew an understanding of political events, see Jeffery A. Jenkins and Brian R. Sala, "The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824," American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998): 1157-79. portunities. 4 In particular, by analyzing members' vote choices (and thereby their revealed preferences) in the Provisional Confederate Congress, I am able to study their motivations, issue by issue, as the Confederate Constitution was being written. To follow a strategy, as Bensel does, that ignores this wealth of voting data and concludes that the Provisional Confederate Congress is not worth studying because of the limited nature of its proceedings is, in my view, quite short-sighted.
Part 2: The Existence of Political Parties A second chief problem that Professor Bensel raises is that it is impossible to tell a story of partisan behavior and Confederate Constitution-making when "there were no organized political parties at the convention." Further, Bensel argues that "political parties [were not] formally organized in the South during the years just before the birth of the Confederacy." In Bensel's view, then, these "facts" are a damning indictment of my thesis.
Taken at face value, Bensel seems to have a good case. However, the "evidence" behind his conjectures proves to be quite thin upon careful examination. First, he depends completely upon state party histories to make his "no party" case, histories that are themselves suspect. Second, his notion of what a "party" is proves to be exceedingly narrow. As it happens, these two points are interrelated; thus, my response, written as a single argument, will address both.
What is a party? In Bensel's terms, it is a "formal" organization of, presumably, like-minded individuals that maintains its existence over a sufficiently long period of time. With this view of party in tow, based on his readings of state party histories, Bensel does not believe that party competition in the South was sufficiently active in the half-dozen years prior to secession to justify my argument. Why? Because the "formal" party system of the late-1850s/ early-1860s does not resemble the "formal" party system of the early-1850s, due to the fact that the Whig Party as a "formal" national entity had ceased to exist by the middle-1850s. It seems, then, that Bensel, like the historians that he cites, believes that party is a static concept, that is, the notion of what a party is or "looks like" should not change over time. Given that the Whig Party of the early-1850s is not present in the same form in the late-1850s, it is not surprising that Bensel reaches the conclusion that he does.
Party, however, is not a static concept; rather, it is fluid. Following the "conditional party government" theory espoused by David Rohde, a party organization will change depending upon how the political context around it changes.
5 The design and workings of a party organization therefore reflect the political landscape at a given point in time. Returning to the case at hand, I agree with Bensel and most other historians that the national Whig Party, as a formal organization, had disappeared by the middle-1850s. However, it is well documented that the Whig Party in the South survived as an informal organization in various other "formal" manifestations up to the Civil War. 6 According to Kenneth Martis: "In the political realignment of the 1850s some southern Whigs associated with the Democrats, but most found refuge under the American party label."
7 When the American Party collapsed in the South in 1858-1859, former Whigs in Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina, Louisiana, and Virginia ran under various "Opposition" party labels, electing nineteen members to the 36th U.S. House.
8 By 1860-1861, as I discussed in my original essay, those Whigs who were temporarily housed in Opposition parties formed the Constitutional Union Party.
9 Moreover, despite these transitional movements between various "formal" labels, the Whigs did not miss a beat, as detailed by Thomas Alexander: "the shift in party nomenclature from Whig to American in 1856 and to Constitutional Union in 1860 had but little impact on Whig voting strength or party organization in the South." 10 282 JEFFERY A. JENKINS University of Chicago Press, 1995) and John H. Aldrich and David W. Rhode, "Measuring Conditional Party Government" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1998).
6. To his credit, Bensel acknowledges this point. But, because of his very strict view that a party must be a "formal" organization, Bensel discounts the relevance of this point for my thesis. 10. Alexander, "Persistent Whiggery in the Confederate South," 306. Why did the southern Whigs take on alternate labels in the late-1850s? Their reasoning was strategic. The Whig label had suffered greatly from the politicking surrounding the Compromises of 1850 and 1854; thus, Whigs needed a new way of "selling" themselves to voters. By taking on short-term political causes, like nativism and anti-administrationism, they hoped to capitalize on the electoral benefits of the moment. As Joel Silbey states: "Unless the Whigs considered alternative frameworks, they were condemned to perpetual electoral weakness" (see Silbey, The American Political Nation, 1838 -1893 [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991 , 138).
Thus, on the eve of the Civil War, the old Whig Party organization still existed in the South, albeit in a different form. With this more fluid definition of party emanating from the theory of conditional party government, the basis for my thesis remains intact.
Finally, there is the matter of whether parties played a role in the Confederate Constitutional Convention. Professor Bensel, relying again upon the work of historians, concludes that the answer was "no," because members of the convention were not elected with partisan affiliations and there is no evidence that partisan labels or partisan appeals were used in convention proceedings. Yet, we again see the informal "spirit" of party present, as delegates who were selected to the convention had known partisan backgrounds and were representing counties with longtime partisan attachments.
11
Rather than rely solely upon historical evidence to counter Bensel's own historically-based claim, I apply the tools of social science to the investigation. First, a method of discerning party's existence (or nonexistence) within the convention must be found. A search for party effects within Congress is ultimately a search for the existence of institutional parties, which are, at their heart, organized voting coalitions. Thus, whether the old Democrat-Whig divisions were present during the writing of the Confederate Constitution is an empirical question that can be examined by studying members' vote choices in relation to their former party labels.
12 To conduct my examination, I will move beyond the simple party-vote comparisons used in my original essay and apply multivariate statistical techniques for a more definitive analysis.
Part 3: The Importance of Protective Tariffs and Internal Improvements Professor Bensel's final point is the following: "tariff protection and internal improvements had ceased to be the primary issues . . . in the South long before the Provisional Confederate Congress met." Once again, I am in agreement. In the 1850s, the primary issue in the South was slavery, around which a largely nonpartisan, ideological coalition was built. After secession, however, the slavery issue was decided. That is, the new Confederate states agreed that slavery would continue unhindered; thus, slavery was taken out of the mix as a valid, political issue. At that point, I argue that it was natural for political leaders to drift toward the pre-1850s "reversion point," or divisions of the past, which were the two primary issues of the Second Party System: protective tariffs and federal funding for internal improvements. While the members of the newly-formed Confederate states saw eye-to-eye on slavery, this was not the case on protective tariffs and internal improvements. Thus, it seems reasonable that these two issues would reemerge as primary issues in the politics of the Confederacy. That is, until the Democrats took them out of the mix, thanks to Constitutional prohibitions, to which I now turn.
PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: FURTHER EVIDENCE
Most histories of Confederate politics argue that the Confederate Congress was devoid of a party system, a claim that has been substantiated by roll-call analyses of Confederate Congressional proceedings. 13 However, both the historians and roll-call analysts place much of their emphasis on the First and Second Confederate Congresses, with little mention of partisanship during the Provisional Confederate Congress. Before looking explicitly at the individual votes during the Confederate Constitutional Convention, I first turn my attention to a search for party in the Provisional Congress.
There were 279 recorded roll-call votes in the four sessions of the Provisional Confederate Congress, twenty of which came when members finished their daily activities and reassembled in the evening as convention delegates. Taking the 259 nonconvention roll calls and analyzing them using a vote-scaling technique developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 14 I find little evidence to support the existence of the old Democrat-Whig party system. 15 Simply put, parties lend "structure" to roll-call voting, enticing members to maintain consistent voting patterns; however, the structure of voting in the Provisional Confederate Congress was far too unstable, relative to two-party U.S. Congresses, to indicate that party was a significant factor. 16 Was there partisan behavior, however, in the Confederate Constitutional Convention? More specifically, is there evidence of party pressure on votes related to the issues underlying the old Democrat-Whig divisions? Unfortunately, no individual-level vote data exist for protective tariff legislation, as only state-level vote choices were recorded. However, as I indicated in my previous essay, individual-level vote data do exist for internal improvements legislation. There were two cases in which the yeas and nays of the entire body were called and recorded: first, on Bartow's (W-GA) motion to table Rhett's (D-SC) amendment to prohibit federal funding for internal improvements, and second, on the passage of Rhett's amendment. 17 Thus, while not providing a complete picture, these two roll-call votes offer the context required to search for Democrat-Whig partisan effects.
To analyze these two votes, I construct a multivariate regression model, more specifically, a logit model. 18 Once again, I turn to vote-scaling techniques developed by Poole and Rosenthal and apply them to the roll-call voting data from the Provisional Confederate Congress to produce two sets of spatial ideology measures, referred to as "Nominate" scores, which I incorporate as independent variables.
19 These spatial ideology measures represent members' revealed preferences on the principle issue dimensions uncovered by the vote scaling. Because there is little evidence of party being present in the proceedings of the Provisional Congress, these spatial ideology scores can also be thought of as "party-free" preferences. As a third independent variable, I include the past party affiliation of members. 20 The question then becomes: were members' votes on the two internal improvement roll calls merely a function of their spatial ideologies, that is, consistent with their ideological beliefs, or did party pressure also play a factor? 21 Results from the two regressions appear in Table 1 . The evidence is striking: the ideological predilections that members exhibited in the Provisional 18. Logit models are appropriate when the dependent variable is discrete, as in the case of an individual vote choice (yea or nay).
19. For a more in-depth discussion of the Nominate technique and spatial ideology, see Poole and Rosenthal, Congress. 20. Again, as in my previous essay, I incorporate four different partisan coding schemes to arrive at partisan affiliations.
21. In contemporary studies of Congressional voting behavior, including both Nominate scores and party in the same regression equation is problematic, because they are so highly correlated (often over 0.9). This is because a large portion of the spatial ideology represented by the Nominate scores is party induced. This issue of collinearity does not plague my analysis, however, because the Provisional Confederate Congress lacked a party system. Thus, the correlations between the two Nominate dimensions and party are a modest 0.16 and 0.08, respectively.
Confederate Congress played no significant role in their voting behavior on either of the internal improvement roll calls. Instead, party proved to be the driving force behind members' vote choices, as the old Democrat-Whig divisions appear to have determined the legislative outcomes. On the vote to table the internal improvements amendment, the party variable is significant (p Ͻ .01) and in the predicted direction (negative), as Democrats voted against tabling while Whigs voted for tabling. Similarly, on the vote to pass the internal improvements amendment, the party variable is again significant (p Ͻ .05) and in the predicted direction (positive), as Democrats voted for passage while Whigs voted against passage. Thus, the internal improvements issue, which had once been a contentious issue between Democrats and Whigs in the U.S. Congress, remained a contentious issue between Democrats and Whigs during the writing of the Confederate Constitution.
That, however, is not the end of the story. Party proved to be the significant determinant in ten of the remaining eighteen roll-call votes cast in the convention, on such issues as supreme court jurisdiction, Congressional appropriations, the slave trade, and admittance of new states into the Confederate republic. 22 Thus, on twelve of the twenty roll calls (60 percent) during the 286 JEFFERY A. JENKINS 
CONCLUSION
Here, then, is the evidence. While party indeed seems to have been absent in the Provisional, First, and Second Confederate Congresses, the old Democrat-Whig divisions were very much alive during the Confederate Constitutional Convention. In particular, the "fingerprints" of party voting were noticeably present on the constitutional prohibition of federal funding for internal improvements, a troublesome partisan issue from decades past.
Once the protective tariff and internal improvement issues were settled, along with some other ancillary matters in the convention, there were no immediate cleavages by which to sustain the Democrat-Whig divisions. New cleavages may very well have developed over time, and, in turn, the old DemocratWhig conflicts may have continued; however, just one month after the convention adjourned, in April 1861, the firing on Fort Sumter began, and civil war was in the offing. The new issues created by war -conscription, habeas corpus, impressment -did not fit cleanly into the former partisan politics, and a "new" party system, organized around the new set of issues in play, did not emerge before the war had ended. Would a new party system have emerged, had the war been prolonged? Richard Beringer suggests that the answer might be "yes," as a roll-call analysis finds that "peace" and "war" factions had grown more stable in the Confederate Congress as the war had progressed. 24 What if the Confederacy had won the war? According to Beringer: "In a victorious Confederacy new political parties doubtless would have resumed rivalry along old Whig-Democratic lines." 25 This, of course, is merely speculation, but one can safely say that as of March 1861, the old DemocratWhig divisions that had defined the U.S. politics of the prior two decades were still present in the politics of the Confederacy.
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